Download the pdf.

Ownership in Champagne cases

            In the case of winemakers in the Champagne region, individual winemakers typically do not own the goodwill associated with the term "Champagne." Instead, they hold a right linked to the use of a protected geographical indication (PGI), which allows them to use the name "Champagne" as part of the collective regional designation. The ownership of the goodwill associated with the term "Champagne" is held collectively by the region as a whole, protected under French and European Union law.

            The right to use "Champagne" is based on the appellation d'origine contrôlée (AOC) system, which regulates the designation under strict guidelines. Thus, individual producers have a right to use the name "Champagne" under this system but do not individually own the goodwill; the goodwill is legally attributed to the broader regional designation, ensuring that only wines produced within the Champagne region and meeting the AOC standards can use the name. This protection prevents others outside the region from exploiting the goodwill of "Champagne."

            The ownership of the name "Champagne" lies not with individual winemakers but within the broader, collective framework established through the appellation d'origine contrôlée (AOC) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) systems, which are enforced under both French and EU law. These systems ensure that "Champagne" as a designation is safeguarded and may only be used by producers within the defined geographical boundaries of the Champagne region, provided they adhere to stringent production standards and quality controls.

            Under this framework, individual winemakers are granted the right to use the "Champagne" name as part of a collective identity rather than as individual property. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law, including cases like Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC) v Aldi Süd Dienstleistungs-GmbH & Co. OHG (C-393/16), demonstrates that "Champagne" is protected as a geographical indication. In the Aldi case, the CJEU reinforced that names associated with such geographical indications must remain exclusive to products genuinely originating from the defined area and produced under prescribed standards. This prevents non-Champagne producers from benefitting from the reputation associated with the Champagne name, thereby safeguarding its distinctiveness.

            Thus, individual winemakers contribute to and share in the collective recognition and value associated with "Champagne." However, the goodwill linked to "Champagne" does not reside with any single winemaker but is, in essence, pooled and protected within the legal boundaries of the region as a whole. The control and protection of the name are managed by bodies such as the Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC), which act to preserve the integrity of the Champagne designation, ensuring that it remains exclusive to wines genuinely meeting the criteria established by the AOC.

English law and Champagne

            In English law, rights associated with the goodwill in champagne trading cases—or any case involving trademarks, branding, and reputation linked to a product—are held by the party that has established the recognition and reputation tied to specific goods or services. Goodwill is generally viewed as an asset that attracts customers and can be intrinsic to a brand, meriting legal protection. In champagne-related cases, case law focuses on geographic origin and brand identity, which are essential in establishing rights and protection over goodwill.

            One leading case on goodwill is Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), where Eddie Irvine, a well-known Formula One driver, succeeded in an action for passing off when his image was used without permission, leveraging the goodwill associated with his reputation. The court highlighted that goodwill represents a proprietary right, acting as an “attractive force” that brings in custom, established through continuous and deliberate use in commerce. In champagne trading, a similar principle applies; goodwill in the brand and reputation of a champagne producer, such as Moët & Chandon, is linked to the business responsible for cultivating customer loyalty and brand recognition.

            Furthermore, AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd [1915] 84 LJ Ch 449 provides a foundation for understanding rights linked to goodwill in England. This case sets out the three essential elements required to succeed in a passing-off action, which involves protecting goodwill: the plaintiff must show they possess goodwill, that there has been misrepresentation by the defendant, and that damage has resulted from this misrepresentation. In champagne trading, if a competitor used a well-known brand’s name or image to market their champagne, the aggrieved brand could potentially claim a right over the goodwill and seek redress, provided these conditions are met.

            Another instructive case is Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731, known as the “Advocaat” case. This case reinforced the notion that goodwill is tied to the distinctiveness and reputation of a product originating from a specific source. The House of Lords ruled that using the name “Advocaat” for a non-authentic product constituted passing off, affirming that goodwill is intrinsically tied to both the product’s origin and its branding characteristics. Champagne is particularly susceptible to such considerations, given its protected designation of origin under EU law. This implies that the goodwill associated with any “champagne” product should rightly align with producers in the Champagne region, France, who maintain its recognised standards and reputation. Thus, even in UK courts, rights linked to goodwill in champagne trading would typically favour producers who meet this regional criterion.

            In conclusion, English case law suggests that in champagne trading, the rights linked to goodwill are generally vested in the entity that has established a recognised and respected reputation connected to the specific champagne product or brand. This protection is further supported by trademark rights and the protected designation of origin status, resonating with cases like Spalding and Advocaat, which underscore the critical role of brand distinctiveness and geographic origin in establishing and maintaining rights over goodwill.

Application to bitcoin

            The principles surrounding goodwill and rights in English law, particularly those seen in champagne trading cases, can be analogously applied to Bitcoin, especially in regard to the distinctiveness of the term “Bitcoin” and its original protocol. Just as Champagne producers rely on a protected designation to establish rights based on a collective reputation and region, Bitcoin’s foundational design—asserted to be “set in stone” by its creator, Satoshi Nakamoto—creates a distinctive protocol that builds and sustains its own unique form of goodwill. Those who adhere to the original protocol can thus claim rights tied to this distinctiveness, akin to the appellation controls in Champagne, where only authentic products from the defined region meet the criteria.

            In Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002], where the court held that the goodwill associated with Eddie Irvine’s image and reputation entitled him to protection, a similar argument could be made for those following Bitcoin’s original protocol. Just as Irvine’s use of his identity was legally safeguarded against unauthorised exploitation, rights associated with the term "Bitcoin" can be argued for under the assurance that the protocol’s design would remain fixed, thereby providing recognisable, original characteristics that differentiate it from versions altered by developments like SegWit and Taproot.

            The AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd [1915] case, where goodwill protection required proof of a unique reputation, misrepresentation, and subsequent damage, underpins a similar framework for Bitcoin. Adherents to the original protocol might argue that changes to Bitcoin (BTC) misrepresent the original system, creating a situation where those who followed the initial “set in stone” assurance face harm through deviation. This could allow those original adherents to claim rights based on the distinctiveness of Bitcoin’s original design, where any alternative use of the name “Bitcoin” that strays from these core principles could be construed as misleading.

            Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979], or the “Advocaat” case, further strengthens this concept of rights based on origin and product integrity. Just as the term "Advocaat" was protected to ensure authenticity, the distinct term “Bitcoin” can be similarly argued to carry rights for those adhering to the original protocol, safeguarding the term from alterations that obscure its foundational design. This case’s emphasis on the specific origin of products supports the argument that the rights to the term “Bitcoin” are held by those who uphold the protocol as originally intended, safeguarding it from misrepresentative changes in function or appearance.          

            In the context of promissory estoppel, those who committed resources based on Satoshi’s assurance that Bitcoin’s protocol was “set in stone” may claim a right to maintain that original protocol’s integrity. Alterations that deviate from the original promises could be viewed as undermining this commitment, just as non-authentic products misrepresent Champagne. Consequently, the term “Bitcoin” itself, like “Champagne” or “Advocaat,” might carry rights not of ownership per se but of authenticity, linking the term directly to the original protocol and those who uphold it.

            In English law, the rights associated with Bitcoin's original protocol, much like those seen in champagne trading cases, are rooted in maintaining authenticity rather than ownership of the name "Bitcoin." The rights do not lie in the name itself but in adherence to the original protocol's distinctive, immutable characteristics. Promissory estoppel could support those following the original design, as any deviation undermines the reliance on Satoshi’s assurance that the protocol was “set in stone.” This reliance creates a claim to uphold the protocol’s consistency, akin to the collective rights in geographic indications like "Champagne," which protect authenticity and prevent misrepresentation without individual ownership of the designation.

Download the pdf.

Rights Under Promissory Estoppel

            Under a promissory estoppel argument, Dr. Wright might not claim ownership of the name "Bitcoin" per se, but if there were an assurance that the protocol and its foundational elements were “set in stone” and he then built upon it in reliance on that assurance, he could argue he holds a right linked to the use of the name or system, akin to a vested interest.

Promissory estoppel in this scenario would focus on any promise or representation that Bitcoin's protocol or branding would remain unchanged. If it can be established that a promise was made (explicitly or implicitly) to maintain a stable foundation for Bitcoin's structure, and Dr. Wright acted in reliance on this assurance by dedicating resources or development efforts, he might then have an enforceable right or interest—though not outright ownership—based on that reliance. This right would be connected to the expectation created by the initial representation, and his reliance could, theoretically, give him standing to prevent actions that undermine or alter what was “set in stone.”

            Such a right would not equate to direct ownership of goodwill or trademark but would instead be a form of reliance-based protection, giving Dr. Wright a claim to uphold the protocol's consistency if deviations infringe upon his investment or commitment made under the promise of immutability.

            In the context of Bitcoin, applying the concept of promissory estoppel would focus on Satoshi Nakamoto’s assurances that the protocol was "set in stone." This promise of immutability, if relied upon by individuals like Dr. Wright who have invested in Bitcoin's original design and functionality, could indeed create enforceable rights, even if those rights do not translate into outright ownership of the Bitcoin name or protocol itself. Promissory estoppel would recognise a vested interest in maintaining the integrity of the protocol, particularly where individuals have relied on these assurances to their detriment by dedicating resources, development, or capital under the belief that the foundational elements of Bitcoin would remain unaltered.

            Under English case law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel allows a party to prevent another from reneging on a promise when the promisee has relied on that promise to their detriment. The case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 established that if a party makes a clear representation intending another to act upon it, and the latter relies on it, that representation may be binding. Applying this to Bitcoin, Dr. Wright could argue that the foundational promise that Bitcoin's protocol was "set in stone" represented an assurance upon which he and others relied. If significant investments or contributions were made in reliance on this stability, they could assert that a departure from the original protocol breaches that foundational promise, invoking promissory estoppel to prevent deviation from the original design.

            If Dr. Wright—and others following the original protocol—have acted on the assumption that Bitcoin’s design would remain fixed, their reliance is akin to the regional producers in the Champagne analogy. In this case, their actions would not confer outright ownership of Bitcoin’s name or protocol but would create a legitimate claim tied to the expectation of stability. This would mean that any modifications, like SegWit or Taproot, which alter Bitcoin’s core mechanics, might be seen as infringing upon the rights established through reliance on the protocol's immutability.

            This vested right, though not a direct ownership of goodwill or trademark, would serve as a reliance-based protection, allowing Dr. Wright to argue for the protocol's consistency and integrity under the original principles. This argument aligns with cases like Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, which clarified that promissory estoppel does not grant new rights in itself but prevents the promisor from acting in a way that contradicts the original promise if reliance is shown. Dr. Wright could thus claim a right to uphold the original protocol if changes to it undermine the commitment he made, supported by the understanding that Bitcoin was “set in stone.”

            By invoking promissory estoppel, Dr. Wright could also establish that individuals who follow the original protocol are similarly protected by this reliance. Such a position would not equate to ownership of Bitcoin’s name but rather confer a standing to maintain the protocol's adherence to its original promises, preventing others from redefining Bitcoin and, consequently, misrepresenting the original system. This aligns with English common law, which supports the idea that reliance on a clear representation of intention, such as Bitcoin’s protocol immutability, creates enforceable rights to prevent deviation if detriment and reliance can be demonstrated.

            In sum, Dr. Wright’s claim would hinge on the argument that, like the Champagne designation, the original Bitcoin protocol represents a collective, region-like identity defined by immutability. Under promissory estoppel, anyone adhering to this original protocol could assert rights based on this shared reliance, fostering continuity and protecting the "goodwill" of the original design against modifications that could otherwise infringe on the expectations initially established by Satoshi Nakamoto’s representation.

Download the pdf.

To provide a fully extended and rigorous analysis, distinguishing Dr. Wright’s position under promissory estoppel from the concept of collective ownership as seen in Champagne cases, it is essential to explore the nature of ownership, rights, and goodwill in a detailed, multi-layered manner. This analysis will examine the legal and philosophical foundations of ownership in English law, how collective rights function in geographically protected products like Champagne, and the role of promissory estoppel as a reliance-based right rather than a proprietary claim. By doing so, we can delineate the scope of Dr. Wright’s interest in Bitcoin as distinct from any proprietary or ownership-based claim, clarifying why his reliance under promissory estoppel does not confer rights in the Bitcoin name or system but rather secures his adherence to an immutable protocol.

Ownership in English Law: Control, Exclusivity, and Transferability

Ownership in English law is one of the most comprehensive rights a person or entity can have over property, including both tangible and intangible assets. Ownership encompasses a range of rights—commonly referred to as a "bundle of rights"—that include the right to possess, use, modify, transfer, and exclude others. English law traditionally views ownership as providing extensive control over an asset, granting the owner the ability to utilise it to the fullest extent, unless legally restricted.

1. Fundamental Characteristics of Ownership: In English legal thought, ownership signifies dominion and control, a legal right that enables an individual to exercise substantial power over the asset. This control includes the right to transfer, alter, or destroy the asset, highlighting ownership’s comprehensive nature. In Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Strange 505, ownership was implicitly described as an entitlement enforceable against the world, allowing the owner to exercise their will over the asset and exclude others.
2. Ownership of Intangibles: Goodwill as Proprietary Interest: The concept of ownership extends beyond physical objects to include intangible assets, such as goodwill. Goodwill is often defined as the reputation or recognition that draws custom to a business, and it is considered an intangible asset that attaches to the entity generating it. Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217 highlights that goodwill, as an asset, encompasses the proprietary interest in consumer loyalty and reputation, acting as an "attractive force" for business. Lord Macnaghten’s explanation in Muller characterises goodwill as inherently tied to the business itself, transferrable upon sale, and protected by passing-off actions, which underscore its proprietary nature.
3. Rights of Ownership vs. Rights Based on Usage or Reliance: Ownership includes enforceable rights against third parties, enabling the owner to prevent misuse, misrepresentation, or unauthorised exploitation of the asset. This is evident in cases like AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd [1915] 84 LJ Ch 449, which emphasises that goodwill as ownership confers the power to stop others from trading on the goodwill’s reputation without permission. This sets a high threshold, where ownership is an enforceable right that protects the asset’s integrity and prevents unauthorised appropriation.

Ownership in Collective Designations: The Champagne Case as a Model of Collective Goodwill

The Champagne case represents a unique model in which ownership of the name “Champagne” is not held by individual winemakers but is vested collectively in the Champagne region. This model, enforced under French and EU law, illustrates a geographically defined form of collective ownership, wherein individual producers have a right to use the name provided they adhere to specific production standards. This structure differs fundamentally from traditional ownership as it operates under collective rights linked to geographical designation and regulatory control, rather than individual, transferrable ownership.

1. Geographical Indications and Appellation d'origine Contrôlée (AOC): The Champagne designation is protected under the appellation d'origine contrôlée (AOC) and the European Union's Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) frameworks, ensuring that only wines from the Champagne region that meet rigorous standards may bear the “Champagne” name. In Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne v Aldi Süd Dienstleistungs-GmbH (C-393/16), the CJEU held that Champagne is a geographical indication that must remain exclusive to products genuinely originating from the defined area. This decision highlights the collective nature of the Champagne designation, where the region as a whole holds enforceable rights to the name, not individual winemakers.
2. Rights to Use Without Proprietary Control: The right to use the “Champagne” designation is restricted to producers within the Champagne region who comply with prescribed standards, but individual winemakers do not own goodwill in the name independently. Instead, they share in the collective goodwill protected by the Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC). This regulatory body acts as a custodian, ensuring that the name “Champagne” is reserved exclusively for wines meeting the AOC standards, preventing dilution of the Champagne name by producers outside the region or those within the region who do not meet the required standards.
3. Control and Enforcement by Collective Bodies: Under the Champagne model, the control of the designation resides with the CIVC, which enforces compliance with the AOC standards. The collective ownership framework ensures that the goodwill associated with “Champagne” is maintained without individual proprietary claims by winemakers. This is a critical point of distinction from traditional ownership, as the control rests with a collective entity rather than with individual stakeholders, ensuring uniformity and preventing individual alteration.
4. Goodwill as a Collective Asset in Geographical Indications: The goodwill associated with Champagne, therefore, exists as a pooled asset for the entire region, with individual producers benefiting from its reputation through their adherence to collective standards. This model aligns with the EU's intent to protect regional authenticity, as exemplified in PGI frameworks, establishing collective rights in the goodwill of regional names to protect reputation and prevent misleading use outside the designated area. This contrasts significantly with traditional proprietary ownership, which provides individual, transferable control over the asset.

Dr. Wright’s Position: Reliance-Based Rights Through Promissory Estoppel

Dr. Wright’s reliance on the promise that Bitcoin’s protocol was “set in stone” does not confer ownership or proprietary rights in the name “Bitcoin.” Rather, his position is grounded in promissory estoppel, which provides a reliance-based right without the ability to control, alter, or exclusively claim the asset. Promissory estoppel operates under equity to prevent a promisor from deviating from an assurance upon which the promisee has relied to their detriment.

1. Promissory Estoppel in English Law: Protecting Reliance Without Ownership: Promissory estoppel, as established in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130, functions as a defensive right to prevent unjust outcomes where reliance has occurred. Promissory estoppel is limited to preventing the promisor from retraction and does not create new or proprietary rights for the promisee. Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 further clarifies that promissory estoppel is a shield, not a sword, meaning it does not confer ownership or control but secures the promisee’s reliance position.
2. Wright’s Position as Reliance, Not Ownership: Under promissory estoppel, Dr. Wright’s right is confined to following the original protocol of Bitcoin based on the promise that it was “set in stone.” This reliance-based right does not allow him to alter the protocol, control the name “Bitcoin,” or claim goodwill, as these would be powers vested in proprietary ownership. Instead, his position is akin to the user-rights seen in collective designations, where he has a right to continue using the protocol as originally intended without the control or exclusivity granted by ownership.
3. No Enforceable Rights Against Third Parties: Unlike the collective ownership in Champagne, where the CIVC enforces compliance, promissory estoppel provides no such enforceable rights against third parties. Dr. Wright’s right is personal and does not extend to preventing others from modifying or using Bitcoin differently. This distinction is crucial, as it illustrates that promissory estoppel does not create rights in the name “Bitcoin” but merely protects Dr. Wright’s adherence to the protocol’s original form.

Distinguishing Promissory Estoppel from Collective Ownership in Champagne

The collective ownership in Champagne, which grants enforceable rights over the designation, fundamentally differs from the reliance-based protection of promissory estoppel. Champagne’s model illustrates that a group can exercise control over a name without individual proprietary rights, while promissory estoppel allows only for reliance without control or enforceability.

1. Collective Ownership and Enforcement: The Champagne framework provides enforceable rights over the designation through a regulatory body, a feature absent in promissory estoppel. Dr. Wright’s reliance under promissory estoppel lacks collective authority, enforceability, or regulatory control, distinguishing his position from Champagne’s protected designation.
2. Ownership vs. Reliance-Based Use: Champagne’s goodwill is collectively owned by the region, granting exclusive rights enforceable through the CIVC. Dr. Wright’s position under promissory estoppel, however, provides only a right to follow the original protocol without proprietary interest or collective protection. This reliance on a promise of immutability is personal and lacks the power associated with collective goodwill ownership.
3. No Ability to Alter or Enforce Exclusivity: Champagne’s model includes the ability to exclude non-compliant or non-regional producers. Dr. Wright’s reliance does not enable him to enforce exclusivity or alter the protocol, as promissory estoppel does not confer ownership rights. Unlike Champagne producers who benefit from a collective right to exclude, Dr. Wright’s claim is limited to his continued adherence without the capacity to control third-party use of “Bitcoin.”

Application to Dr. Wright’s Claim: Rights Without Ownership or Control

English case law on ownership and promissory estoppel underscores that Dr. Wright’s position does not equate to ownership of Bitcoin. His reliance-based right aligns with the integrity of the original protocol, not with control, alteration, or the ability to prevent third-party usage. This reliance lacks the enforceability and exclusivity found in both Champagne’s collective ownership and traditional proprietary rights in goodwill.

1. Rights to Follow Without Ownership: Promissory estoppel grants Dr. Wright the right to follow the original protocol but does not create a proprietary claim over the Bitcoin name. This reliance-based right reflects a commitment to protocol immutability but lacks the authority of collective goodwill or the control of proprietary ownership.
2. Distinction from Collective Ownership Models: Unlike Champagne, where the CIVC acts as a custodian of collective rights, Dr. Wright’s position lacks any similar mechanism of enforceable control. His reliance-based right under promissory estoppel does not impose constraints on third parties or define exclusivity, confining him to the original protocol without extending enforceable rights over the “Bitcoin” name.

Conclusion: The Legal Limitation of Dr. Wright’s Reliance-Based Right

Dr. Wright’s reliance on promissory estoppel grants him the right to follow the original Bitcoin protocol, akin to a user-right without control or ownership. This right, while personal and enforceable against the promisor, does not confer the collective enforcement, exclusivity, or proprietary interest seen in Champagne’s collective ownership model. Consequently, Dr. Wright’s position under promissory estoppel does not contravene the court’s restriction on claiming goodwill or proprietary rights in Bitcoin. His interest is limited to adherence to the original protocol, a conditional right that contrasts with both traditional ownership and the collective ownership seen in Champagne’s designation.

Download the pdf.

To thoroughly examine the concept of database rights under UK law, particularly focusing on individuals who have not created the database but have significantly invested in it, an analysis is needed of the legal framework that protects database creators, owners, and significant investors. Database rights in the UK, under the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032), provide protection to databases where substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting content has been made. This protection creates an exclusive right for the database maker, but there exists a nuanced distinction between the rights of the database owner and those of other contributors or investors.

Database Rights Under UK Law: Ownership and Exclusive Control

Under UK law, database rights are an intellectual property (IP) protection designed specifically for databases, separate from copyright. These rights are sui generis, meaning they are distinct from other IP protections, aiming to secure the structure and content organisation of a database when there has been a substantial investment in its development.

1. Definition and Scope of Database Rights: Database rights were introduced through the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, implementing the European Database Directive (Directive 96/9/EC) in the UK. A database right applies where there is a substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the database’s contents, as defined under Regulation 13. Importantly, database rights protect not the individual pieces of information but the collection, organisation, and structure created through substantial investment.
2. Who Owns Database Rights?: According to Regulation 14, the maker of a database—that is, the person or entity responsible for the substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting its content—is the primary holder of database rights. In practice, the owner often is the entity or individual who financed or directed the creation of the database, rather than contributors or later investors. This aligns with the fundamental principle of IP law, where the person responsible for the creative or structural input typically holds rights in the final product.
3. Nature of Ownership in Database Rights: Ownership of database rights confers the ability to control extraction and reutilisation of substantial parts of the database’s contents. As per Regulation 16, the database owner has the exclusive right to prevent unauthorised extraction or reuse of its contents, effectively giving them control over how the database is accessed and used by others. This control extends to preventing others from duplicating or repurposing the database’s contents in a way that undermines the original investment.

The Position of Significant Investors: Non-Creator Contributions and Reciprocal Rights

The rights of individuals who have not created the database but have invested significantly in its development are less straightforward. UK law does not automatically confer ownership of database rights to investors or contributors who did not make the database but have invested resources into it. However, these individuals may still obtain certain reciprocal or conditional rights depending on the nature of their investment and agreements made with the database owner.

1. Investors vs. Makers of the Database: In the UK, the concept of database rights primarily benefits the maker of the database, as opposed to those who merely invest or contribute post-creation. This delineation is rooted in Regulation 14, which designates ownership to the entity responsible for the substantial organisational or structural investment. For significant investors, their rights would generally be governed by contractual terms or licensing agreements rather than by database rights themselves.
2. Reciprocal Rights Through Contractual Agreements: In cases where significant investors contribute post-creation, UK law allows them to negotiate contractual rights that may enable access or use of the database, as these investors do not hold database rights directly. Investors can secure reciprocal rights to extract or utilise database contents via contractual agreements that specify the scope of their access, data extraction, or redistribution rights. For example, a licensing agreement could allow an investor limited extraction rights without conferring full ownership.
3. Contributions and Rights to Database Maintenance and Updates: In scenarios where a database requires ongoing investment for updates or verification of information, investors who finance this maintenance may obtain a form of usage rights. These rights are often reciprocal, granting access proportional to their investment but still falling short of the comprehensive ownership granted to the original database maker. UK case law, such as Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd [2012] 1 All ER 947, reinforces that while significant ongoing contributions are recognised, database rights fundamentally belong to the initial maker unless there is a clear transfer of rights.

III. Distinguishing Ownership from Reciprocal Rights in Database Law

To effectively differentiate between ownership rights and reciprocal rights for significant investors in databases, it is crucial to understand how UK law structures exclusive control and access in relation to the original investment.

1. Ownership as Exclusive Control: Database ownership rights in the UK are absolute in their exclusivity, enabling the owner to control third-party access and dictate terms for extraction or reuse. This exclusivity means that the owner can prevent others from commercially benefitting from the database without permission, as demonstrated in British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 863. Here, the court upheld the database owner’s right to control extraction despite other parties having a commercial interest in accessing the data.
2. Reciprocal Rights as Conditional and Non-Exclusive: By contrast, reciprocal rights are inherently conditional. They may enable an investor to utilise the database but not in a manner that competes with or undermines the owner’s control. Investors with reciprocal rights may access the database for internal purposes, research, or specific commercial applications as specified in contractual agreements, yet without ownership, they lack the ability to prevent third parties from also obtaining rights directly from the database owner.
3. Limited Ability to Extract or Reuse: While database owners possess exclusive extraction and reuse rights, significant investors with reciprocal rights typically face restrictions, limiting their ability to copy, extract, or exploit the database beyond agreed terms. Football Dataco Ltd v Stan James (Abingdon) Ltd [2013] FSR 1 reiterates that database rights vest control in the maker, with the primary focus on safeguarding their investment, which contractual rights alone cannot equate to.
4. Distinguishing Ownership from Contributions: The Requirement of Substantial Investment

Ownership of a database right requires that the holder has made a substantial investment in creating or structuring the database. This requirement is a key distinction between rights held by creators or owners and those held by later investors.

1. Substantial Investment Criterion: Database rights exist to protect those who have made substantial investments in obtaining, verifying, or presenting data. Under Regulation 13, substantial investment refers to a significant allocation of financial, human, or technical resources. The decision in Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB [2004] 2 WLR 366 clarified that the investment must be directed toward obtaining, verifying, or presenting the database contents to meet the threshold for database rights. Without this direct investment, later contributors do not qualify for ownership.
2. Contributors and Supplementary Investments: Later investors who contribute to a database do not meet the substantial investment criterion for database rights unless their contributions constitute an integral part of the database’s creation or reconfiguration. This distinction preserves the rights of the original database maker while allowing for supplementary contributions that support but do not replace the original investment, thereby preventing dilution of ownership.
3. Investments Directed at Use or Expansion: Contributions made after the database’s initial creation typically pertain to usage or expansion rather than foundational development. For instance, if a research organisation finances data collection using an existing database, their contributions expand its utility but do not convert their role into that of a maker. In cases where multiple parties share investments, ownership remains with the party who directed the structure or curation of the database.
4. Legal Implications of Distinguishing Database Ownership and Reciprocal Rights

Distinguishing ownership from other rights in databases has significant legal implications, particularly in terms of enforcement, access, and commercial value.

1. Enforcement Rights: Ownership of database rights allows the owner to enforce their rights by preventing unauthorised extraction or reuse of the database contents. For investors with reciprocal rights, enforcement is typically limited to breaches of contractual terms. They do not have the power to pursue infringement actions or to exclude others from similar access without the owner’s authorisation.
2. Access Rights and Commercial Use: Ownership rights grant the database owner broad control over access and commercial exploitation, whereas reciprocal rights are limited to agreed-upon uses, with scope for extraction and reuse defined by contract. This creates a legal and practical distinction where ownership equates to commercial exclusivity, while reciprocal rights are conditional and restricted by contractual scope.
3. Future Investments and Database Evolution: When a database evolves, ownership rights continue to rest with the original maker unless new substantial investments redefine its structure, potentially leading to a co-ownership arrangement if jointly agreed. Investors, however, do not automatically gain ownership of future iterations of the database and must renegotiate for expanded usage or access rights as the database evolves.

Conclusion: Ownership Versus Reciprocal Rights in UK Database Law

In UK law, database rights firmly belong to the creator or maker who directed the initial investment into structuring the database, providing them with exclusive control over extraction and reuse. Significant investors who contribute post-creation, although essential in sustaining or expanding the database, do not gain ownership rights. Their rights are defined reciprocally, often secured by contract, allowing conditional access but falling short of the control or enforcement powers intrinsic to ownership. This delineation protects the integrity of the database owner’s investment while permitting flexibility for contributors, who can use but not claim rights to the database structure itself.

Download the pdf.

To argue that, under UK law, those who wish to use a database protected by database rights need the permission of the right-holder and that Satoshi Nakamoto, as the original maker, holds these rights, we must explore how database rights operate and how promissory estoppel enables Dr. Wright to enforce the original protocol. This analysis will demonstrate that database rights are exclusive to the maker, granting control over access and reuse, and that Dr. Wright’s enforcement ability arises not from ownership but from reliance on Nakamoto’s promise, secured under promissory estoppel.

The Foundation of Database Rights in UK Law: Exclusive Control by the Maker

Database rights in the UK, introduced through the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, grant protection to databases where a substantial investment has been made in obtaining, verifying, or presenting data. These rights are distinct from copyright, focusing on the structure and content of the database itself rather than any underlying data.

1. Definition and Scope of Database Rights: Database rights provide the maker—defined as the entity responsible for the substantial investment in structuring or verifying the database’s content—with an exclusive right over the extraction and reutilisation of the database’s content. According to Regulation 13 of the 1997 Regulations, database rights extend specifically to the organisation, selection, and arrangement of content, protecting the maker’s investment against unauthorised use by third parties.
2. Exclusive Rights of the Maker: Under Regulation 16, the database right-holder has the power to authorise or restrict extraction and reuse of substantial parts of the database, effectively giving them full control over how others may interact with it. This right to authorise extraction or reuse ensures that no party can access or utilise the database without the permission of the right-holder, who retains sole discretion over such permissions. This exclusivity is core to the concept of database rights, aligning with the foundational principle that the creator of the investment-intensive structure holds the right to control and monetise it.
3. Requirement for Third-Party Permission: By law, any third party who wishes to access, extract, or reuse protected parts of the database must first obtain explicit permission from the right-holder. Without such permission, any extraction or reuse would be unauthorised and would constitute an infringement of database rights, enforceable under UK law by the right-holder. This requirement establishes the right-holder’s control as both preventive and conditional, ensuring that the original maker’s investment is not diluted through unauthorised use.

Satoshi Nakamoto as the Original Database Right-Holder in the Bitcoin Protocol

To apply these principles to the Bitcoin protocol, we assume that Satoshi Nakamoto, as the creator of the Bitcoin database, holds the original database rights. By virtue of substantial investment in developing, verifying, and arranging the protocol’s structure, Nakamoto would qualify as the database maker, with exclusive control over extraction and reuse rights.

1. Substantial Investment in the Bitcoin Protocol: Nakamoto’s creation of the Bitcoin database involved substantial intellectual and technical investment, from the protocol’s initial design to its verification and implementation. Under the UK’s 1997 Regulations, such an investment in organising and structuring the database meets the threshold for database rights protection, meaning Nakamoto holds the original right over extraction and reuse.
2. Database Rights Conferring Exclusive Control to Nakamoto: Given Nakamoto’s role as the maker, UK law would recognise Nakamoto as holding the exclusive right to determine how others may use or extract content from the Bitcoin database. This includes the protocol’s arrangement, block structure, and system rules, which form the database’s framework. As the right-holder, Nakamoto’s control extends to barring or permitting third parties to interact with the database according to its originally defined parameters.
3. Permission Requirement for Third Parties: Since Nakamoto holds exclusive rights, any third party wishing to use, alter, or benefit from the protocol would need Nakamoto’s permission to avoid infringing upon database rights. This permission is crucial to accessing the database lawfully, as Nakamoto’s status as the right-holder would allow them to dictate the terms of such use, ensuring that any deviation from the original protocol requires explicit authorisation.

Dr. Wright’s Ability to Enforce Database Rights Under Promissory Estoppel

While Nakamoto holds the database rights, Dr. Wright’s position does not stem from ownership but rather from reliance on Nakamoto’s assurance that the protocol would remain “set in stone.” This reliance is protected by promissory estoppel, enabling Dr. Wright to enforce Nakamoto’s promise and preserve the integrity of the original protocol against unauthorised changes.

1. Promissory Estoppel as a Basis for Enforcement: Promissory estoppel, as established in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130, prevents a promisor from reneging on an assurance if the promisee has relied on it to their detriment. In this case, Nakamoto’s assurance that the protocol would be immutable created a reliance interest for Dr. Wright, who contributed resources and commitment based on this promise. Promissory estoppel therefore functions not as ownership but as a mechanism allowing Dr. Wright to uphold Nakamoto’s promise that the database would not change.
2. Wright’s Reliance on the Original Protocol: Dr. Wright’s reliance on the “set in stone” assurance means that his right to enforce the protocol’s immutability is grounded in promissory estoppel rather than ownership. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, as clarified in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, is defensive; it enables the promisee to uphold the promisor’s commitment but does not confer any new proprietary rights. Dr. Wright’s enforcement power, therefore, operates solely to ensure adherence to Nakamoto’s original protocol, without extending control over the Bitcoin database in the proprietary sense.
3. Enforcement as a Guardian of Nakamoto’s Database Rights: Dr. Wright’s role under promissory estoppel is analogous to that of a guardian of Nakamoto’s database rights, acting to enforce Nakamoto’s original terms rather than exerting independent control. His authority to prevent unauthorised changes to the protocol arises from his reliance interest in the protocol’s immutability, making him an enforcer of Nakamoto’s promise but not an owner of the protocol or its database rights. This reliance-based enforcement preserves the original database framework as promised by Nakamoto, preventing deviations that would undermine the initial investment and integrity.

The Distinction Between Ownership and Enforceable Reciprocal Rights in UK Database Law

Dr. Wright’s enforcement rights under promissory estoppel differ fundamentally from ownership, creating a distinct form of reciprocal right that allows enforcement of Nakamoto’s promise without the power to alter or transfer the protocol.

1. Reciprocal Rights as Enforcement Without Control: While ownership allows the right-holder full control, including the ability to transfer or modify rights, reciprocal rights under promissory estoppel do not extend this far. Dr. Wright’s position grants him the right to enforce Nakamoto’s promise, preserving the protocol’s integrity, but does not allow him to change or otherwise control the database independently. This aligns with the equitable principle of promissory estoppel, which enables the promisee to maintain the status quo without granting additional rights.
2. Non-Proprietary Enforcement Rights: As an enforcer under promissory estoppel, Dr. Wright’s rights are specifically reciprocal, grounded in his reliance on Nakamoto’s assurance. This reliance gives Dr. Wright enforceable rights against those who attempt to deviate from the original protocol, akin to enforcing a reciprocal agreement without proprietary claims. His enforcement capability thus functions as a specific action-based right, distinct from the full bundle of rights that a database owner would possess.
3. Legal Basis for Enforcing Against Third Parties: Although Dr. Wright does not hold proprietary rights, promissory estoppel provides him with a basis for enforcement against third parties who diverge from the original protocol. His reliance on Nakamoto’s promise means that he can prevent deviations, ensuring that any use of the database adheres to the immutable framework. While he cannot authorise or modify the protocol, he can require that third parties comply with the original terms as specified by Nakamoto’s promise, preserving the database’s integrity in line with Nakamoto’s control.

Practical Implications: The Permission Requirement and Dr. Wright’s Role in Upholding Database Integrity

Given Nakamoto’s status as the original right-holder, any third party wishing to use the Bitcoin database must obtain permission to ensure their actions do not infringe upon database rights. Dr. Wright’s role under promissory estoppel reinforces this requirement, as he has the authority to prevent unauthorised alterations, preserving the protocol’s intended form.

1. Permission Requirement as Safeguard Against Unauthorised Use: The exclusive nature of database rights means that third parties must seek permission from the right-holder—here, Nakamoto—to engage in extraction, reuse, or modification of the protocol. Dr. Wright’s ability to enforce this requirement under promissory estoppel adds an additional layer of oversight, ensuring that third parties operate within the bounds of the original protocol or risk enforcement action.
2. Role of Dr. Wright as a Reliance-Based Enforcer: Dr. Wright’s role as an enforcer of Nakamoto’s protocol under promissory estoppel allows him to act as a gatekeeper against unauthorised changes. His reliance on Nakamoto’s “set in stone” assurance means that he can require adherence to the original protocol, compelling third parties to either secure permission from Nakamoto or refrain from deviation. This enforcement function is limited to Nakamoto’s original terms, further distinguishing Dr. Wright’s rights from ownership.
3. Ensuring Database Integrity Through Promissory Estoppel: By enforcing Nakamoto’s promise, Dr. Wright maintains the integrity of the Bitcoin database as a unified, unaltered protocol. His rights under promissory estoppel do not permit him to modify the protocol but only to ensure that its original design is respected, serving as a practical guardian of Nakamoto’s database rights. This creates a unique form of reciprocal enforcement where Dr. Wright’s interest is in preserving, rather than controlling, the database.

Conclusion: Enforcement Rights as Reciprocal Rights in UK Database Law

Under UK law, database rights rest exclusively with the maker—in this case, Satoshi Nakamoto—who retains control over extraction, reuse, and any changes to the protocol. Dr. Wright, however, possesses a distinct, reciprocal right under promissory estoppel to enforce Nakamoto’s original terms. His role is to uphold Nakamoto’s promise, ensuring that third parties obtain permission or adhere strictly to the unaltered protocol. This reliance-based enforcement right allows Dr. Wright to act as a protector of the original database framework without claiming ownership or control, illustrating how promissory estoppel can create reciprocal rights that enforce database integrity in the absence of direct ownership.

Download the pdf.

In UK law, the distinction between ownership in rights and the ability to enforce revolves around the breadth and depth of control, exclusivity, and transferability associated with each concept. Ownership in rights encompasses a comprehensive set of entitlements that allow the owner not only to control the use and exploitation of the asset but also to transfer, modify, or even exclude others entirely. Enforceability, on the other hand, refers to the narrower ability to uphold specific terms or conditions related to the asset, typically grounded in legal or equitable doctrines such as promissory estoppel. Enforceability permits action to maintain compliance with agreed terms but lacks the full spectrum of powers inherent to ownership.

Ownership of Rights: Control, Exclusivity, and Transferability

Ownership is the most extensive form of legal entitlement, providing the owner with broad control over the asset and a range of powers that extend beyond mere usage.

1. Control and Authority: Ownership confers complete control over the asset, allowing the owner to dictate how it is used, who may access it, and on what terms. This includes the right to modify, adapt, or discontinue the asset’s use entirely. In the context of database rights, for example, ownership enables the right-holder to manage all aspects of the database’s commercial exploitation, access, and reproduction.
2. Exclusivity and Exclusion: Ownership includes the exclusive right to exclude others from using or benefiting from the asset without permission. The owner can prevent unauthorised access and assert their rights against infringers, underscoring ownership as an in rem right—one that is enforceable against the world. In database rights, this exclusivity means that the owner alone may authorise or restrict others’ extraction and reuse of the database’s contents.
3. Transferability and Alienation: Ownership rights include the power to transfer, sell, or license the asset, either in whole or in part. This transferability is fundamental to the concept of ownership, distinguishing it from enforceability, which is typically non-transferable and more limited in scope. Ownership allows the right-holder to fully alienate the asset if desired, giving another party comprehensive rights over it.

The Ability to Enforce: Limited, Reliance-Based, and Non-Exclusive

Enforceability refers to a narrower legal ability, typically based on equitable doctrines or contractual agreements, allowing a party to compel adherence to specific terms without possessing ownership. This ability is rooted in reliance or reciprocal arrangements rather than the broader control inherent in ownership.

1. Reliance-Based Authority: Enforceability often arises from reliance on an assurance or promise, as seen in promissory estoppel. Here, a party may enforce compliance with specific terms—such as maintaining the original state of a database—based on their detrimental reliance on the promisor’s assurance. This is a protective, not proprietary, right, enabling the enforcer to prevent deviation but not to alter or transfer the asset. For instance, in the case of Dr. Wright enforcing the original Bitcoin protocol, his ability stems from Nakamoto’s promise that the protocol was “set in stone,” securing his reliance without conferring ownership.
2. Non-Exclusive and Conditional: Unlike ownership, enforceability under promissory estoppel is conditional and non-exclusive. The enforcing party lacks the power to prevent others from using the asset, nor can they exclude or modify access independently. Enforceability is specific to maintaining the original terms as promised but does not grant the full, in rem rights of ownership. The enforcer’s authority is limited to ensuring compliance, with no additional control over broader or new uses of the asset.
3. Inability to Transfer or Alienate: Enforceable rights cannot typically be transferred or alienated, as they are contingent upon the original assurance and the specific reliance of the enforcing party. Promissory estoppel rights are inherently personal, protecting the reliance interest of the promisee without creating transferrable ownership. This personal and conditional aspect means that enforceability does not grant the enforcer ownership’s transferability or exclusivity.

The Distinction in Practical Terms: Ownership as Broad Authority vs. Enforceability as Protective Right

Ownership provides the most extensive authority over an asset, encompassing exclusive, transferrable, and alienable rights. In contrast, enforceability through mechanisms like promissory estoppel is a protective right, preventing specific breaches of agreed terms without extending ownership’s full range of powers.

1. Ownership’s Breadth of Powers: Ownership is a full bundle of rights, allowing the right-holder to use, modify, exclude, transfer, or destroy the asset. This range of powers makes ownership far broader than enforceability, which does not grant comprehensive control or the ability to dictate all aspects of the asset’s use.
2. Enforceability as Conditional and Limited: Enforceability is grounded in specific conditions, such as upholding an original assurance or contractual term. It is limited to maintaining these agreed terms, enabling the enforcer to prevent unauthorised changes or deviations but lacking the wider autonomy of ownership. This limitation is significant, as enforceability cannot be wielded to assert control over the asset’s future applications beyond the original terms.

In summary, ownership is comprehensive and multifaceted, granting exclusive and alienable rights over an asset, whereas enforceability through promissory estoppel is a specific, reliance-based right focused solely on maintaining compliance with original terms. This distinction positions ownership as a far wider concept, encompassing both control and discretion over an asset, while enforceability is protective, restricted to preserving agreed conditions without extending ownership’s full breadth of powers.

Download the pdf.

In examining the nature of database rights for early miners of the Bitcoin protocol, it is essential to distinguish between the rights they acquire through their participation in the database’s creation and the concept of ownership held by Satoshi Nakamoto as the original creator. Early miners possess certain rights as a result of their involvement in building the database, but these rights are markedly different from ownership in several critical ways. Specifically, the rights of early miners are non-transferable, limited in scope, and do not confer the full spectrum of control that ownership entails. This analysis will delve into the implications of these distinctions, referencing English case law to clarify the breadth and exclusivity inherent in ownership versus the restricted, non-transferable nature of the rights of early miners.

The Basis of Rights for Early Miners: Creation and Participation in the Database

Under UK law, database rights are granted to those who make a substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting data, as codified in the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997. Early miners, by virtue of their participation in the formation of the Bitcoin database, contribute to its development and thus acquire certain rights associated with their role in creating the data structure.

1. Creation-Based Rights for Early Miners: Early miners’ rights emerge from their contribution to the blockchain, specifically through the verification and addition of blocks. These actions constitute a form of participation in the database’s development, granting them access rights or usage permissions tied to their role in expanding and supporting the network. These rights are grounded in the miners’ actions and involvement in the blockchain’s structure but are intrinsically limited by the framework set by the original creator.
2. Non-Transferable Nature of Miner Rights: Unlike Satoshi Nakamoto, who holds the comprehensive rights of the database’s original creator, early miners cannot transfer their participation-based rights. These rights are functionally bound to their individual contributions and do not extend to the broader control associated with ownership. This limitation means that early miners’ rights are personal and cannot be alienated, sold, or assigned to third parties, underscoring their restricted scope compared to true ownership.

Ownership as Defined in English Law: Control, Transferability, and Exclusivity

Ownership in English law confers the widest possible set of entitlements over an asset, including exclusive control, the ability to exclude others, and the right to transfer or modify the asset at will. English case law on ownership underscores that it involves not only usage rights but also full autonomy over the asset, which includes the ability to alienate or dispose of it entirely.

1. Control and Transferability in Ownership: Ownership entails complete authority over an asset, allowing the owner to use, modify, or transfer it as they see fit. In Milmo v Carreras [1994] 4 All ER 133, the court noted that ownership is a “comprehensive right” over an asset, involving both control and the power to exclude others. This broad control includes the right to commercialise, alienate, or share ownership through licensing or sale, enabling the owner to determine the asset’s future without restriction.
2. Exclusivity and Alienability: Ownership rights are characterised by their exclusivity, meaning the owner alone holds the right to dictate how the asset is used and who may access it. This exclusivity was further explored in Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Strange 505, where the court held that ownership provides an enforceable claim against all others, including the right to dispose of the property as one chooses. Alienability, or the ability to transfer ownership, is a fundamental aspect of ownership, distinguishing it from more restricted rights such as those of early miners.
3. Broad Scope and Transfer in Ownership Compared to Limited Scope for Miners: The wide scope of ownership includes both the power to determine the asset’s use and the flexibility to transfer that power to others. In contrast, early miners have only limited, non-transferable rights derived from their participation in the database. They cannot convey their rights to others, nor can they modify the terms of the protocol established by Nakamoto, emphasising the non-proprietary nature of their position in relation to the database.

The Distinction Between Miner Rights and Ownership: Scope, Transferability, and Control

The rights of early miners differ from ownership in scope, as they lack the broad autonomy and transferability associated with true ownership. Their rights are limited to usage within the original framework set by the database’s creator and do not include the power to control or modify the protocol.

1. Limited Scope of Miner Rights: The rights of early miners are narrowly defined, allowing them to interact with the database in ways aligned with their contributions but without broader control over the database. These rights do not permit alteration, redistribution, or full commercialisation outside the original terms established by Nakamoto, distinguishing them sharply from ownership. In Lord Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479, the court discussed that ownership entails a wide scope of entitlements over an asset, whereas more limited rights are inherently conditional, applicable only within specific contexts or conditions.
2. Non-Transferability as a Key Distinction: A primary difference between ownership and miner rights is transferability. Ownership includes the right to sell or transfer control to third parties, a characteristic not applicable to the rights of early miners, which are inherently non-transferable. Their rights are strictly personal, rooted in their individual contributions and restricted to their continued participation. This non-transferability indicates a personal rather than proprietary interest in the database, a distinction that aligns with the principles of Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554, where the court outlined that limited or conditional rights lack the comprehensive scope needed for alienability.
3. Control and the Ability to Modify the Database: Ownership confers full control over the database, including the power to alter or evolve its structure. In contrast, early miners cannot modify or dictate the terms of the database; they merely hold a right to interact with it as participants. Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd [2012] 1 All ER 947 demonstrates that the database right-holder has the exclusive power to control access and usage, a control not extended to mere participants. Early miners lack the autonomy to direct the database’s future use or change its terms, a limitation that emphasises the difference between their rights and ownership.

Nakamoto’s Ownership vs. Miners’ Limited Rights: Database Rights in Context

As the original creator of the Bitcoin protocol, Nakamoto holds ownership of the database rights, including full control, exclusivity, and transferability, setting a sharp contrast to the conditional rights of early miners. This ownership allows Nakamoto to determine the protocol’s usage, while early miners are restricted to following the original terms without the authority to transfer or alter their rights.

1. Nakamoto’s Ownership as Comprehensive and Transferable: Nakamoto’s ownership of the database rights includes the full suite of ownership powers—control, alienability, and enforceability. Unlike early miners, Nakamoto has the power to permit or deny access, modify the protocol, and transfer rights if desired. This full ownership position, supported by UK database law, permits Nakamoto to operate independently of the participants, maintaining exclusive authority over the database’s core principles.
2. Miners as Holders of Reciprocal, Non-Exclusive Rights: Early miners’ rights, in contrast, are reciprocal rather than proprietary, meaning they exist within the original terms Nakamoto established but lack any capacity for modification or alienation. Miners’ rights are confined to usage in line with Nakamoto’s framework, reinforcing their dependence on the initial conditions set by the owner. Their rights are usage-based rather than ownership-based, which means they can use the protocol but not alter or transfer their participation rights.
3. Promissory Estoppel as Enforcement Rather Than Ownership: For Dr. Wright, his ability to enforce the protocol’s original terms arises not from ownership but from Nakamoto’s promise that the protocol would be “set in stone.” This reliance-based enforcement allows Dr. Wright to ensure adherence to the original design without the transfer, control, or exclusivity that comes with ownership. Promissory estoppel grants him a specific enforcement right against deviations from the original protocol, but it does not grant him the alienability or modification rights inherent to ownership.

Legal Implications of the Distinction: Enforceable, Non-Proprietary Rights for Miners

The distinction between ownership and the rights held by early miners underscores how UK law reserves database ownership for those with full investment-based entitlements, while granting limited, enforceable rights to those who participated without creating the database. This approach maintains the integrity of ownership, restricting it to those with primary investment and creation roles, while enabling others to use the database in compliance with the original terms.

1. Non-Proprietary Rights for Miners: The rights of early miners are functionally limited and non-proprietary, allowing them to interact with the database but lacking the full set of ownership powers. They are unable to transfer or assign their rights, which remain tied to their personal contribution, distinguishing them from the alienable and exclusive rights Nakamoto holds as the owner.
2. Enforceability Through Reliance Rather Than Ownership: Dr. Wright’s ability to enforce Nakamoto’s terms reflects a reliance-based entitlement rather than ownership. By relying on Nakamoto’s promise, he holds a right to uphold the database’s original design but does not possess the alienable or transferable rights associated with ownership. His enforceable interest under promissory estoppel maintains the protocol’s consistency without granting the broad authority that ownership provides.

Conclusion: Ownership’s Comprehensive Nature vs. Miners’ Non-Transferable Rights

In summary, UK law draws a clear line between ownership, with its wide scope, transferability, and exclusivity, and the non-transferable, limited rights held by early miners. Nakamoto’s ownership of the database rights includes the ability to exclude, transfer, and control usage, a full proprietary entitlement. In contrast, early miners have conditional, non-transferable rights tied to their participation but lack any authority to modify or alienate the database. Dr. Wright’s position, grounded in promissory estoppel, allows enforcement of Nakamoto’s original terms without conferring the comprehensive powers of ownership, marking a distinct difference between reliance-based rights and the broad, autonomous nature of ownership.